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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN MARYLAND
By

REuBEN OPPENHEIMER.*

While the subject of administrative law has not as yet
found a place in any Maryland Digest, it is, in the opinion
of many, the most important in modern jurisprudence.'
As the functions of the State and its municipalities have
increased with the growing complexity of economic life,
more and more of the operation of our governmental machinery has been transferred to boards and commissions.
The average Maryland citizen is far more apt to come into
contact with legal processes as they are carried on by these
administrative boards than he is to be involved in court
proceedings. The Maryland Unemployment Compensation
Board, to take only one example, has had over one hundred
and twenty-two thousand claims filed with it in the first
three months of 1938, more than the total number of civil
cases filed in the Baltimore nisi prius courts, inclusive of
the People's Court, in a whole year.
The State of Maryland has in operation over forty
boards and commissions, to whom the Legislature has entrusted the carrying out of important policies. These function more or less independently. They carry on and to
some degree combine executive, quasi-legislative and quasi* Of the Baltimore City Bar, A. B., 1917, Johns Hopkins University;
LL. B., 1920, Harvard Law School. Lecturer on Administrative Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law.
See Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Address to Federal Bar Association, U. S.
Daily, Feb. 14, 1931, and address to American Law Institute, The NewYork Times, May 13, 1938; Hewart, The New Despotism (1929) ; Committee
on Ministers' Powers Report (1932 Cmd. 4060) ; Stone, The Common Law in
the United States (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 16, et seq. As examples of the

growing popular realization that boards and commissions constitute a

fourth branch of government, see Everything's Under Control,by Drew Pear-

son and Robert S. Allen, Cosmopolitan Magazine, January, 1938; and Independence Preserved, by Frank R. Kent, The Sun, Baltimore, December 29,
1937.
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judicial functions. This number does not include the many
municipal and county bodies of the same general nature.
A Marylander today is born under the auspices of a
doctor whose qualifications have been passed upon by a
Board of Medical Examiners, and a nurse whose fitness
has been determined by the State Board of Examiners of
Nurses. If he attends the public schools, the scope of his
education and the text books which mold his thoughts are
selected or approved by the State Board of Education.
If, after his schooling, he wishes to become a doctor, lawyer, dentist, architect or plumber, he must satisfy the appropriate State board of his qualifications before he can
begin to earn his living. His very movements to and from
work bring him into close contact with the processes of
administrative law. The carfare or taxicab fare which he
pays are determined by the Public Service Commission;
if he drives an automobile, his license may be revoked
for any cause which the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
deems sufficient; he cannot even take to the air without
a license from the State Aviation Commission. His amusements are closely supervised by administrative bodies. The
moving pictures that he sees are only those which the Maryland State Board of Censors has determined are not sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, inhuman or immoral; if he
wishes to attend a prize fight, the exhibitor must have obtained a license from the State Athletic Commission; if
he places a bet at a race track, he does so under the rules
and regulations prescribed by the Maryland Racing Commission. The food which he eats has been inspected or
comes from premises approved by the State Board of
Health. If he wishes to convert his dwelling into a store,
he probably must obtain a permit from the Zoning Commissioner. If he is engaged in any one of a large number
of occupations and has an accident in the course of his
employment, his compensation is determined by the State
Industrial Accident Commission. If he loses his job, he
goes to the Unemployment Compensation Board. When
he reaches the age of sixty-five, his old age pension is administered by the Board of State Aid and Charities, and
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when he dies his interment will be presided over by a licensee of the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers.
Administrative law involves the nature of the operations of administrative agencies, as well as the control
exercised by courts over their creation and activities.
There is no greater need in Maryland governmental affairs than for a comprehensive and comparative study of
the first aspect of the subject. As to the second, the decisions of the Court of Appeals show a statesmanlike analysis of the proper judicial function in this field. It has been
observed by one of the most eminent authorities on the
subject that the general failure to recognize an administrative law has hampered its development and delayed
the solution of its real and manifold problems. 2 It is submitted, however, that, in Maryland at least, the very failure to admit administrative law as a member of the legal
hierarchy has resulted, despite some confusion of thought,8
in a needed elasticity during a formative period. The roots
of our modern boards go deep into history, but their tremendous growth in number and importance is a phenomenon of this century. The periphery of legal decisions within which our Maryland State and local boards can function might not have been drawn with the same breadth and
understanding had it been traced too soon.
DEIEGATION OF POWER TO STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

If so many of the discussions of administrative law
are concerned with questions of constitutionality, it is because, in the past, the impingement of board and court
has largely been in that realm, and because the very consideration of the constitutionality of these boards and
commissions often brings out their structure and the nature of their functioning.
The Court of Appeals has found no difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of the creation of such agencies of state government as the Public Service Commission4
'Felix Frankfurter, Foreword (1938), 47 Yale L. J. 515, 517.
'See Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 462, 133 Atl. 465 (1926).
'Gregg v. Public Service Commission, 121 Md. 1, 87 At. 1111 (1913).
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and the State Industrial Accident Commission.' These
decisions, on the side of administrative law, involve not
only the right of the Maryland Legislature to delegate its
power to the necessary extent, but also the applicability
of Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, which declares
"that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from
each other; and no person exercising the functions of one
of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties
of any other."
The right of the Legislature to delegate some of its
powers to a municipal corporation was early recognized,'
and one hundred years ago the same principle was invoked
to uphold the legislative grant of power to a board to license
doctors.! The question of the mingling of powers, on its
face, is more difficult. Article 8 of the Declaration of
Rights presented a more concrete barrier than any which
the Supreme Court has had to hurdle under the Federal
Constitution. The State Industrial Accident Commission,
for example, as the Court of Appeals pointed out in the
Solvuca case, is required to exercise judgment and discretion and to apply the law to the facts in each particular case; it can make reasonable and proper rules to govern its procedure8 and is to satisfy itself of the ability
of employers to make the required payments. Analytically, these functions, it is submitted, are respectively judicial, legislative and administrative. Nor can we obscure this fact by invoking the thought-saving prefix
"quasi". Similarly, while the establishment of a rate
by the Public Service Commission may be taken as a making of a rule for the future and, therefore, an act legislative, not judicial, in kind, an examination of the weekly
number of complaints heard by the Public Service Commission certainly indicates that a large part of its activi'Solvuca

v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 Atl. 710 (1917).

Harrison v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264 (1843) ; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 412, 74 Atl. 581 (1909).

7 The Regents' Case, 9 G. & J. 365, 398 (1838).
See also Downs v. Swann,
111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653 (1909).
)Clark v. Harford Agricultural & Breeders' Asso., 118 Md. 608, 85 At.
503 (1912).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ties are concerned with that determination of specific
controversies between definite parties which we commonly
associate with the judicial process.
Decisions such as the Solvuca and Gregg cases rest,
it is submitted, on three grounds:
First, these boards, while operating as independent and
important agencies in the carrying out of state policies, do
so on a plane which, in theory at least, is subordinate in
importance to that occupied by the legislative, judicial and
executive branches of our government. It is certainly true
that their policies and indeed their very existence is dependent upon the will of the Legislature which created
them, while the functions and powers of the Governor,
the Judges and the Legislature are imbedded in the Constitution. Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights is to be
taken, upon this reasoning, as having reference only to
those three orthodox parts of the Government and is,
therefore, not applicable to other subordinate agencies.9
It may be noted in passing, as a commentary upon the
vagaries of nomenclature, that this line of thought invokes
the so-called strict interpretation of the Constitution to
attain a so-called liberal result.
Second, there is the historical argument. The mingling
of functions in administrative boards as well as the existence of these organisms go far back in English and American history. Reference can be made, for example, to the
Commissioners of Sewers of the Sixteenth Century, who
were given legislative powers, powers to impose rates upon
landowners, and to fix and collect penalties for non-payment. 10 We can turn to the English Justices of the Peace,
who, in addition to their ancient local powers over migration of laborers, assessment of wages and preservation of
rivers, were, in Tudor times, given the power to compel
action by towns in regard to fortification, to assess and
collect taxes for repair of bridges, to punish surveyors of
bridges for negligence, and to license ale houses, and who
I See Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829) and Wright v. Wright,
2 Md. 429, 452 (1852).
20 23 Henry VIII, e. 5
(1531). See Report of Committee on Ministers'
Powers (1932 Cmd. 4060) 8 et seq.
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played an important part in that national system of control of wages and prices in the sixteenth century which
in many respects foreshadowed modern times.1 ' In our
own country, local blending of judicial, administrative and
executive functions was an accepted and approved fact at
12
the time of the formation of the United States.
Third, there is the argument of necessity. The Court
of Appeals itself has called attention to the fact that these
administrative boards and commissions are necessitated
because of "the constantly increasing complexity of modern society.... The field has become so vast, and the things
to be considered so enlarged in number and so interrelated with one another, that it has been found practically
impossible to provide in laws and ordinances specific rules
and standards by which every conceivable situation can
be measured and determined. The result has been that
we have turned more and more to the plan of providing
in our laws and ordinances general rules and standards,
and leaving to administrative boards and agencies the task
of acquiring information, working out the details, and applying these rules and standards to specific cases.""
Chief Judge Bond has said:
"Legislation which has to provide for a large num'ber of special cases of varied facts, or for unforseeable
conditions present or future, must be supplemented
by the action of administrative officers with power to
adapt and vary the rule as the special cases come before them, one by one. If this were not permissible,
then the legislative branch of the government could
not deal with some of the needs of the country or of
the community at all, for it can be done in no other
way.... Senator Elihu Root, who speaks with the authority of a most profound understanding of our institutions and of the law, said to the American Bar
Association in 1916: 'As any community passes from
simple to complex conditions the only way in which
government can deal with the increased burdens thrown
Administrative Law, (1929) 54.
21Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, (1927)
3.3, n. 5; 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial Ed. 1903) 44.
" Tighe v. Osborne, 8upra, Note 3.
1Port,
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upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised
in detail by subordinate agents, subject to the control
of general directions prescribed by superior authority.
The necessities of our situation have already led to an
extensive employment of that method. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, the State Public Service Commissions, the Federal Trade Commission, the powers
of the Federal Reserve Board, the health departments
of the states, and many other supervisory offices and
agencies are familiar illustrations. Before these agencies the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative powe-has virtually retired from the field and
given up the fight. There will be no withdrawal from
these experiments. We shall go on; we shall expand
them, whether we approve theoretically or not, because
such agencies furnish protection to rights and obstacles
to wrongdoing which under our social and industrial
conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the
old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts
as in the last generation.'

1

This third and most important ground of necessity is
neither an acceptance of a fait accompli nor a constitutional -abnegation. On the contrary, it is a recognition of
the foresightedness of our constitutional system of government, which is so designed that we may adapt ourselves
to changing conditions and at the same time preserve the
fundamentals of our freedom. Inherent in the doctrine, so
interpreted, is the necessity of seeing to it that these new
agencies we have had to forge to meet new times themselves take their proper place in our system of government, so that the increased regulation which they represent
may be carried out with both fairness and efficiency, with
substantial justice as well as with social wisdom.
RECOGNITION Or MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIES

The difficulty the Court of Appeals has had in connec-

tion with the legality
by municipalities and
the fact that, at least
ministrative law were

of administrative agencies created
counties has been largely caused by
in the early cases, questions of adnot separated from questions of po-

1, Dissenting opinion in Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 312, 320, 321,
128 Atl. 50 (1925).
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lice power. Before the Court determines whether or not
an administrative board is properly set up, it must first
determine whether or not the legislative body has the right
to act at all as to the particular subject matter.1 5 Even
where the two questions are dealt with separately, when it
is decided that the legislative body did not have the constitutional right of regulation, the vigor with which the
unlawful usurpation of power is characterized may be carried over into consideration of the type of regulatory
agency which had been created. 16
In the cases relating to local administrative agencies,
there were additional complicating factors. The zoning
cases, in which the question generally arose, show a changing concept of the police power on the part of the Court;
a distinct difference in point of view in considering the constitutional right to regulate the size and use of buildings
within a municipality is evidenced, for example, in the
two cases of Goldman v. Crowther,'7 and Tighe v. Osborne.'
Moreover, many of the cases involve the subsidiary question of statutory construction as to whether or not the
Legislature had intended to delegate its power. Again,
in some of the zoning cases the regulation was by the municipal body itself, whereas in others it had been entrusted
to separate zoning agencies. It is only lately that the concept of the sub-delegation of powers is shown to have been
but the cocoon from which are emerging true doctrines of
administrative law.
The real import of the zoning cases, insofar as they
relate to administrative law, is best considered by dividing the decisions into categories according to their actual
" In the case of Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570,
55 S. Ct. 837 (1935), for example, the Supreme Court recognized that it had
two separate questions before it; first, whether Congress had the right to
legislate with respect to the poultry industry under the Interstate Commerce
Clause; and, second, whether the type of regulation embodied in the N.R.A.
Code was in itself valid. Both questions were answered in the negative,
but the first involved the right of Congress to act at all as to the particular
subject matter, and the second involved far reaching doctrines of administrative law.
10 See Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 At. 534 (1936). Cf. Singer v.
State, 72 Md. 464, 19 AtI. 1044 (1890); State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 45
AtI. 877 (1900) ; and State v. Loden, 117 Md. 373, 83 Atl. 564 (1912).
"Supra
Note 14. See language of majority opinion at 147 Md. 282, 292.
10
Supra Note 3.
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holdings. The first category comprises those cases where
the zoning was in the nature of municipal legislation, as
where ordinances were passed limiting the height of buildings in a certain locality, 19 requiring open areas in comparatively small sections of a city,"0 or forbidding filling
stations or ice factories in certain areas. 21 These cases
involve only the questions of whether there could be regulation under the police power, and, if there could, whether
the right of regulation had been sufficiently delegated to the
local authority by the State Legislature. They do not involve any real question of administrative law. The decisions involving the actions of local administrative officers
or boards 22 fall within an entirely different category, for,

in these cases, when the right of regulation is sustained,
the question is whether the limitations within which the
regulatory bodies can operate have been sufficiently marked
out, and whether definite standards within which discretion can be exercised have been established. The third
category consists of those cases where the zoning ordinances represent a combination of legislation by the municipality and discretion delegated to administrative agencies.23 In this third category, as the latter cases make
clear, the question as to whether or not the discretion of
the administrative agency was properly canalized, which
is a matter of administrative law, is separate and distinct
from the question of whether or not the zoning legislation
involved is a proper exercise of the police power.
There is still a fourth category of the zoning decisions,
which is by far the most troublesome. These are the decisions where the local legislative body also acts as the administrative agency in carrying out the legislation. It is
11Cochran

v. Preston. 10S Md. 220, 70 Atl. 113 (1908).
'0 Byrne v. Md. Realty Co.. 129 Md. 202, 98 Atl. 547 (1916).
21 Pocomoke City v. Standard Oil Co., 162 Md. 36S, 159 Atl. 902 (1932);
Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222.- 164 Atl. 743 (1933).
22 Bostock v. Sams. 95 Md. 400, 52 Ati. 655 (1902) ; Stubbs v. Scott, 127
Md. 86, 95 Atl. 1060 (1915).
23 Goldman v. Crowther. supra Note 14; Tighe v. Osborne. 149 Md. 349,
131 Atl. 801 (1925) : Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 Ati. 465 (1926) ;

R. B. Construction Co. v. Jackson. 152 Md. 671, 137 Atl. 278 (1927) ; Jack
Lewis, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 Atl.
220 (1933) : Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Church, 164 Md. 487, 165
Atil. 703 (1933).
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submitted that the right given to the Mayor of Baltimore
in the case of Baltimore v. Radecke" to revoke any permit
for the use of a steam engine, and the duty imposed upon
the Commissioners of Easton 25 and the Mayor and City
Council of. Salisbury" to pass upon applications for new
buildings, in reality put these officials in the status of administrative boards or commissions, to the same extent
as though the duty of passing upon applications had been
entrusted to a board of zoning appeals. The mere title
of the governmental officer should not obscure the real
nature of the governmental function which he is performing. The granting of divorces was once a prerogative of
the Maryland Legislature, but that fact did not alter the
judicial nature of the action. The most important aspect
of Panama Refining Company v. Ryan27 is the holding of
the Supreme Court that the principles of administrative
law are to be applied to action administrative in nature,
even though the carrying out of the particular function
has been delegated by Congress to the President of the
United States.
The Court of Appeals has not hesitated to apply the
rules of administrative law to the operations of legislative
or executive officials in certain types of cases, where those
operations are really administrative in nature. 28 The line
of demarcation, then, is not the official title of the agency.
In other cases, however, where the administrative nature
of the official activities seems equally clear, the Court has
decided on the question of poJice power alone, without applying the doctrine that reasonably definite standards must
be laid down to guide administrative action. The only consistency of these cases is on an arbitrary factual classification; where ordinances prohibit the erection of buildings
without a permit from the governing body of the municiMd. 217 (1878).
Commissioners of Easton v. Covey, 74 Md. 262, 22 AUt. 266 (1891).
'Farmers & Planters Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Salisbury, 136 Md.
617, 111 Atl. 112 (1920).
11293 U. S. 388, 79 L. ed. 446, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
28 Baltimore v. Radecke, supra note 24 (steam engines); Hagerstown v.
B. & 0. B. I. Co., 107 Md. 178, 68 Ad. 490 (1908) (live stock); County
Commissioners of Prince George's County v. Northwest Cemetery Co., Inc.,
160 Md. 653, 154 Atl. 452 (1931) (cemeteries).
2449
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pal corporation, the Court regards the exercise of the power
as legislative in nature. 29 The building-permit cases can
only be regarded as an exception to the rule, based, historically, perhaps, upon the realization that, to small communities, the building of each new house is really a matter
of general civic interest, and, analytically, upon the early
confusion between police power and administrative law.
In any event, the rule that administrative boards and
commissions may be validly created by a municipality as
well as by the State itself, if the subject matter of their
regulation comes within powers of the local government,
is firmly established. Whether the organisms of these local
administrative bodies are legally sound, whether the limits of their discretion are sufficiently demarcated, and
whether the nature of their proceedings is in accordance
with due process of law are questions governed, with the
exception of the building-permit cases, by the same principles which apply to the agencies created by the State itself.
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AS AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT

The case of Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers v.
Miller3 0 offers an interesting comparison with the Schechter
case"1 .

Both cases were decided in 1935, the former in De-

cember and the latter in May. Neither case refers to the
other, although both, it is believed, announce the same fundamental principle. The Court in the Miller case expressly refrained from passing upon the power of the Maryland Legislature to regulate the milk industry, 2 whereas in the Schechter case the question of regulation under
the interstate commerce clause was a highly important one.
The administrative machinery in the Miller case was of the
type which the Maryland Court, as well as the Supreme
Court, had, in the past, approved, whereas in the Schechter case the governing body attempted to be created rep29 Kramer v. Mayor & City council of Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 171 Atl.
70 (1934).
-- 170 Md. 81, 182 Atl. 432 (1935).
31 Supra note 15.
32

Cf. Creaghan v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 132 Md. 442, 104

Ati. 180 (1918).
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resented an unprecedented departure from the kind of
administrative boards with which we have become familiar.
Both cases, however, stand for the vitally important principle that an administrative board must be an agency of
government and cannot be merely the vehicle by which an
industry seeks to impose its collective will upon the community.
The point of the Miller case was that the Milk Control Law did not directly and immediately delegate to the
Milk'Control Commission power to supervise and regulate
the milk industry in any specific area. The existence and
the exercise of its powers were expressly conditioned upon
a request by a substantial proportion of "the producers
and/or consumers and/or distributors" in the area to be
established. The regulatory powers of the Commission
could only be invoked by action of an undetermined portion of an unascertained group in an unmarked area. But
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Milk Control Law, it is submitted, rests, not only upon the Court's
refusal to accept a statutory legerdemain, but also upon
the broader concept that, irrespective of how much regulation modern life demands, regulation must be by government and for the community as a whole. Our Legislature will not be allowed to abdicate its functions in favor
of any economic group, just as Congress will not be allowed
to delegate its rights to a national industry. Administrative boards and commissions have properly and necessarily
been given broad powers in the conduct of our governmental affairs, but those powers can be invoked and exercised
only on behalf of the Government itself.
There is a sharp distinction between making regulation
dependent upon the consent of a geographical unit, which
is perfectly valid,n and making it dependent upon the consent of an economic group. It is true that legislation pertaining to a geographical area must today necessarily have
an effect beyond the territorial boundary, but that is far
different, both in quality and degree, from making legis38 Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71 (1875).
Cf. Brawner v. Supervisors of Elections, 141 Md. 586, 119 Atl. 250 (1922).
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lation dependent upon the consent of a majority of the persons engaged in a particular industry. The latter may be
separated from the rest of the community insofar as their
wishes and even their immediate financial interests are
concerned, but our economic structure is too closely interrelated to make it possible that their actions shall not have
far reaching effects upon the community as a whole. The
distinction is that between government by law and government by guild.
It by no means follows that the industry or profession
to be regulated may not validly be called upon to furnish
its own regulators. In Scholle v. State,, the Court upheld
the validity of a statute providing that no person could
practice medicine without qualification before one of two
boards of examiners, even though the members of the
boards were to be appointed, in the one case, by the Medical & Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland and, in the other,
by the Maryland State Homeopathic Medical Society. One
of the essentials for good government by commissions is
that the commissions shall be composed of experts trained
by experience to meet the problems which they are called
upon to face. Even though these experts are supplied by
the group to be regulated, once chosen, they carry on their
duties, not on behalf of their profession, but on behalf of
the State which they represent.
The real nature of an administrative board was made
clear by the Court in the concrete and undramatic way of
the common law, so much more illuminating than definition
or abstract discussion. In the case of Clark v. Harford
Agricultural & Breeders Association,8 the question was
whether the actions of the Harford County Racing Commission were invalid because the members of the Commission
had not taken the oath which the Constitution requires for
persons elected or appointed to office of profit. The Court
held that -the members of the Commission were not of'ficers within the meaning of the Constitution:
s,90
Md. 729, 46 At. 326 (1900).
5

Supra note 8.
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"It was not the design or the purpose of the Act,
that the members of the commission should be independent officers, or to impose upon them, personally,
the powers and duties that were committed to the commission itself under the Act . . . it was not contemplated that the members of the commission should be
independent officers or persons, otherwise, than as
members of a quasi corporation, and it was not intended that they should act as individuals. 6
The Court in the Clark case recognized that the modern
administrative board or commission is a separate kind
of governmental agency with an independent life of its own,
that its members function, not as state or local officials,
but as members of an independent entity. The particular
question in the Clark case was unimportant; many of the
statutes creating administrative boards provide for oaths
to be taken by the members. It is highly important, however, that these boards and commissions be recognized, as
the Court of Appeals has recognized them, as distinct in
nature from the other branches of our Government, with
different duties and with different problems.
The fact that administrative tribunals form a distinct
species of governmental agency and that the legal rules
applicable to them must be conditioned by the nature of
the work which they do, is recognized in the series of cases
to the effect that, in general, a review of their operations
cannot be obtained through the remedy of a writ of mandamus.3 7 Mandamus may be brought to compel the performance of the duty of a public official which is purely
ministerial, but it does not lie where the exercise of judgment involves an element of discretion. That element is
generally inherent in the existence of administrative tribunals. Indeed, the fact that the general policy of the Legislature is to be applied, within proper limits, in the judgment of the agency, is the primary reason for the existence of the tribunal.
118 Md. 608, 617.
Henkel v. Millard, 97 Md. 24, 54 Ati. 657 (1903) ; Lee v. Leitch, 131 Md.
30, 101 Ati. 716 (1917) ; Metcalf v. Cook, 168 Md. 475, 178 Atl. 219 (1935).
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CANAtizATioN

op DisCu Tzo

One of the universal rules of administrative law is that
the discretion entrusted to the board or commission to
carry out the policy of the legislative body must be exercised according to reasonably definite standards. In the
striking metaphor of Mr. Justice Cardozo, the delegation
of administrative power must be "canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing' ".88 The balance must be
struck between the public policy which sustains the granting of reasonable discretion in order to carry out the general mandate, and the equally strong public policy that
individuals must be protected against the granting of an
indefinite authority which may result in arbitrary discrimination.
The phrase "reasonably definite standards" like the
phrase "due process of law", takes on meaning only
as it is applied to concrete circumstances. It is a fundamental, although often unexpressed, principle of administrative law, that whether or not standards are reasonably
definite is to be determined, not by abstract argument, but
by scrutiny of the nature of the governmental policy which
is to be exercised, the field of operation and the practical
difficulties and results of regulation in that field. In the
application of the rule, three pairs of cases decided by the
Court of Appeals are of interest.
The first two cases illustrate the difference between
the failure to provide any reasonably definite standards
and the provision for such standards, in the regulation of
the same subject matter. In County Commissioners v.
Northwest Cemetery Company, Inc.,8g there was before the
Court, on injunction proceedings, the validity of an act of
the Legislature providing that it should be unlawful for
any person, firm or corporation to establish or maintain in
Prince George's County a cemetery or graveyard without
the written permission of the County Commissioners. Violation of the act was made a misdemeanor. The act was
aScheechter v. U. S., 8upra, Note 15, 296 U. 8. 495, 561.
89 160 Md. 653, 154 A. 452 (1931).
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held invalid because the omission to prescribe reasonably
definite standards might result in arbitrary discriminations. In Gordon v. Commissioners of Montgomery County,40 the facts were as follows: The Legislature passed

an act authorizing the County Commissioners of Montgomery County to license and regulate cemeteries within
the limits of the County, and, in order to safeguard the
public health, safety and welfare, to pass rules, regulations or ordinances which should provide proper standards for the exercise of the discretion. The act declared
it to be unlawful to establish or conduct a cemetery in the
County without first obtaining a license therefor from the
County Commissioners if required by any rule, regulation
or ordinance authorized by the act. In pursuance of the
statute, the County Commissioners passed an ordinance
requiring a permit for the establishment or operation of
any cemetery and setting forth the standards which should
govern the granting or refusal of such permits. These
standards provided that consideration was to be given in
the granting of a permit to the number of adjacent residents and the proximity of public institutions within a
specified distance. The plaintiff attempted to open and
operate a cemetery in the County without applying for
and obtaining a permit, and filed a bill for injunction to
prevent the County Commissioners from interfering with
his effort.: A demurrer to the bill was held to have been
properly sustained. The Court held that the standards
prescribed were clearly appropriate and adequate.
Two cases arising under the zoning ordinances of Baltimore City illustrate the difference, as applied to the same
subject matter, between standards unreasonably indefinite
and reasonably definite. In the first case of Tighe v. Osborne,41 the ordinance provided that no building or structure should be erected, nor should the existing use of land,
buildings or structures in Baltimore City be changed, without a permit from the Zoning Commissioner, and that the
Zoning Commissioner should grant permits, unless, in his
'0 164 Md. 210, 164 At. 676 (1933).
11 Supra note 23.
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judgment, after investigation, the proposed building or
change of use would create hazards from fire 'or disease,
or would in any way menace the "public welfare, security,
health or morals". Appeal could be taken from .the Zoning Commissioner to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Another section provided that, in passing upon applications,
consideration should be given to the character and use of
buildings, the number of persons resident in the adjoining
property, the location of water mains, sewers and other
utilities and tratic conditions. The majority of the Court
held the ordinance was unconstitutional; the grant of the
power to the Zoning Commissioner and the Board of Zoning Appeals was held to be arbitrary and without proper
safeguards. A few days after the decision, the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore passed another ordinance, which
also undertook to regulate the grant of "use" permits in
Baltimore City. It differed from the ordinance in the first
Tighe case almost solely in the omission of the two words
"public welfare' from the grant of power to the Zoning
Commissioner and the Board of Zoning Appeals. Under
the new ordinance, the zoning officials were authorized to
refuse to issue permits if the proposed buildings or structures, use or changes of use, would create hazards from
fire or disease, or would menace "the public security,
health or morals". This ordinance was held by the Court
of Appeals, in the second cause of Tighe v. Osborne, to be
2
4

valid.

The second Tighe case is not a reversal of the preceding decision. The omission of the phrase "public welfare"
was more than a mere change of wording. A discretion
which can be exercised in any way which the administrative agency may deem to be for the public welfare is far
more uncontrolled than a discretion limited to the terms
"public security, health or morals". The latter phrase
the Court construed in the second Tighe case to be substantially similar to the words "hazards from fire or disease". This is a definite concept, a standard which can
be applied to particular facts. The general welfare, on the
11Supra

note

a.
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other hand, covers an almost unlimited field of discretion
which can hardly be the subject of any judicial review.
A particular standard can be definite enough to be valid
when applicable to one set of facts and too indefinite to
be constitutional when applied to another. The same zoning ordinance was before the Court in the cases of Goldman v. Crowther3 and R. B. Construction Compavy v,.
Jackson.4

One of the terms of this ordinance was that the

zoning officials were given the right to disregard and, in
effect, set aside its provisions in certain cases where the
zoning officials found there were "practical difficulties or
unnecessary hardships" in the way of carrying out the
strict letter of the ordinance. In the case of Goldmian v.
Crowther, the majority of the Court held, inter alia, that
this power was too arbitrary and indefinite to be sustained
insofar as it applied to the "use" provisions of the ordinance. In the case of R. B. Construction Company v. Jackson, the majority of the Court held that the same phrase in
the same ordinance provided sufficiently definite standards when applied to the matter of provisions for varying
the dimensions of specified areas for side yards. The two
decisions are consistent. In the Goldman case, the Court
expressly said that, even though the phrase failed to provide any proper standards or rules by which the exercise
of discretion must be guided and limited, insofar as applied to the use to which the property cduld be put, it did
not necessarily follow that the standards were insufficient
to limit and control discretion when applied to the location
and construction of buildings. The Court said :5
"For in the one case, the subject of the discretion
is intangible, impalpable, and aesthetic, while in the
other it is material and substantial, and its physical
incidents and consequences are capable of being positively and definitely ascertained. 'Practical difficulties,' and 'unnecessary hardships' may have a definite meaning when applied to the construction of a
building, but are quite meaningless when applied to
,S upra note 14.
"Supra note 23.
45147 Md. 311.
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the effect which the proximity of a small tailor shop
may have on the aesthetic sensibilities of persons in
its vicinity."
The statutes show a great range in the amount of discretion entrusted to the various administrative agencies
in carrying out the legislative policy, a range which is reflected in some of the cases. The discretion may be limited to a selection by the agency between concrete alternatives of action ;40 the statute creating the agency may, with
a particularity which can only be changed by amendment,
enumerate the specific rules governing the exercise of discretion ;7 or the standard can be pulled down to the realm
of constitutional definiteness only by the doctrine of rea48
sonable implication.

DEcIsIoNs WITH RESPECT TO METHOD OF FUNCTIONING

It is inherent in the nature of administrative agencies
that the method of their functioning may differ from that
of legislatures or courts, for they are neither. It is equally true, however, that, if their proceedings involve life,
liberty or property of the citizen, those proceedings must
be such as to do substantial justice. Due process of law
is not confined to judicial proceedings ;49 but due process
of law as applied to administrative action does not connote the same technique that it does in judicial proceedings, if the fundamentals are preserved.
The fundamentals which must be preserved, if the nature of the administrative proceeding is essentially judicial, are provisions for notice to the parties to be affected
and opportunity for a hearing.8 0 There is authority that
even notice and hearing may be dispensed with if the act
46 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Gahan, 104 Md. 145,
04 At. 716
(1906).
11See State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 Atl. 771 (1899).
48See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaaf, 149 Md.
648, 132 Atl. 160 (1926).
,9Ulman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 20 Atl. 141
(1890), overuling Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Johns Hopkins
Hospital, 56 Md. 1 (1881) ; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., supra note 5.
soUlman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, aupra note 49; Jarvis v.
Berlin, 153 Md. 156, 138 Atl. 7 (1927) ; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., supra
note 5.
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creating the agency gives a statutory right of review
broader than mere judicial determination of good faith.5 '
It is clear that there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in preliminary proceedings, at least where the law
52
secures trial by jury upon an appeal.
In one important particular, the Court of Appeals differs from the Supreme Court as to due process in administrative law. Under the doctrine of the Panama Refining
Company case," a definite finding of fact is necessary if
the jurisdiction of the agency is to be sustained. In Maryland, while the reason for the action of the agency should
be made clear in the proceedings, 54 a formalized finding of
fact is not jurisdictional.5
If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing
are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the
same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual. The difference
between an administrative agency whose actions are essentially legislative in character and a tribunal whose functioning is quasi-judicial is illustrated in the cases of Murphy v. State Roads Commission5 6 and Solvuca v. Ryan &
57
Reilly Company.
In the case of Metcalf v. Cook, 58 the State Board of
Education had enacted a by-law that teachers' certificates
should be issued only to graduates of a standard college
who attained a certain scholastic rating. The appellant
had begun his studies, with a view to procuring a teacher's certificate, before the by-law was passed and did not

11

The Personnel Service Co., et al. v. Harry C. Jones, Commissioner, Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Frank, J.), filed Dec. 17, 1936, D. R. Dec. 23,
1936.
5, Steuart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500 (1S55) ; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co.,
s81pra note 5.
5 Supra note 27.
Applestein v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 156 Md. 40, 143 Atl.
666 (1928).
'5 Public Service Commn. v. Byron, 153 Md. 464, 478, 138 Atl. 404 (1927).
159 Md. 7, 149 Atl. 566 (1930).
8 Supra note 5.
' Supra note 37.
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attain the required standing. He was refused a certificate and prayed a writ of mandamus, which the Court of
Appeals held was properly denied. The Court pointed
out that the appellant had no vested right in the standard
of work, and held that there was no requirement in the
formulation of by-laws by the particular agency of notice
to individuals.
There is a borderland of doubt as to what agencies perform essentially legislative functions and what agencies
are really judicial in their operations, from which the
mist of uncertainty can only be rolled back by the process
of inclusion and exclusion. 9 This process in our own
courts has not as yet been invoked to the extent apparent
in the decisions of the Supreme Court. But the Court of
Appeals, in its decisions, has made manifest its realization that the requirements of due process in administrative law depend upon the particular nature of the agency
involved. The cases give weight to the desirability, on
the one hand, of permitting the elastic and informal functioning inherent in the very nature of administrative tribunals, and to the necessity, on the other, of seeing that substantial justice be done the individual in procedure as well
as in result.
It has come to be customary in statutes creating administrative agencies expressly to provide that they shall
not be bound by the ordinary common law rules of evidence. There are two underlying reasons for these provisions. First, many of the individuals affected by the
workings of administrative agencies cannot afford counsel,
so that invocation of trial technique, objections to evidence,
and the technicalities of legal proof, would only penalize economic inequality. Second, the tribunals and commissions should be composed of experts who are better able
in their particular fields to disregard irrelevancies than are
juries of laymen, and whose training should equip them to
weigh and make use of data which the ordinary rules of
evidence would make inadmissible.
11 See Santa Cruz Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 S.
Ct. Rep. 656 (1938).
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Such statutory provisions are not a rejection of the
principles of evidence built up by our Anglo-American system of law through the centuries, insofar as court proceedings are concerned. Most of those rules are predicated
upon the existence of the jury system, whereas administrative tribunals must work under different circumstances.
The process, like many of the processes in connection with
administrative law, is still in the formative stage; like
the development of the substantive common law itself, its
evolution is an adaptation of general principles to changed
conditions and new tribunals.
The Court of Appeals, in a series of cases dealing with
appeals from findings of the State Industrial Accident Commission, has clearly pointed out this process of evolution
and, at the same time, has shown its appreciation of the
fact that the function of the Court is one of guidance rather
than of frustration.
In reviewing the proceedings of the State Industrial
Accident Commission, the Court of Appeals does not pass
directly upon them, but upon the proceedings on the appeal to the nisi prius court permitted by statute. The
Workmen's Compensation Act provides "that the Commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence and technical or formal rules of
procedure, but may make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly
the spirit of this Act". The statutory proceedings in
the nisi prius court are in the "nature of an appeal" and
are to be "informal and summary"6 The Court of Appeals has characterized the nature of the proceedings before the Commission in the following terms:
"In view of the informal nature of the proceeding
under the act, and of the fact that the commissioners
are not required to be trained in the law, the freedom
of action thus allowed is not only wise, but, in the interest of speedy and substantial justice, unavoidable,
but the difficulty has been to define its limits. That
00

Md. Code, Art. 101, Sec. 10: Md. Code Supp., Art. 101, Sec. 56.
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there must be limits to the discretion which the commissioners may exercise in admitting or rejecting evidence appears inevitable, otherwise the whole administration of the article would lack the certainty which
is so essential an element of our jurisprudence, and
the problem has been to formulate working rules which
will not violate the spirit of informality and liberality which is inherent in the article, but which will
prevent the introduction of evidence which under any
system of law should have little or no probative force.
...From an examination of the digests, the text-books
and the decisions of courts of last resort, it cannot
be said that the problem, if indeed in its nature it is
susceptible of final or complete solution, has been satisfactorily solved. The most that has been done is to
mark the outer limits of the discretion reposed in the
commission, leaving its application within those limits
to be determined
by the facts of each case to which it
6
is applied."
The Court review of the proceedings before the Commission brings up the same questions in somewhat different form:
"Under section 56 of the Maryland Statute, in the
'informal and summary' proceedings 'in the nature
of an appeal' the court is required to determine whether the commission has justly considered all the facts
concerning injury. It has not been directed to relax
its established rules of evidence in any degree, or under any conditions. And it seems unquestionably true
that the mere allowance of an appeal must intend a
review of the decision of the commission with some
advantages from the special training and methods of
the judicial tribunal. Yet to test the award or decision of the commission strictly by the rules of judicial proceedings must often subject it to requirements
which a commission would be unable to meet, and
might in effect make it to some degree impracticable for the commission to work effectively without
surrendering the freedom given it in Section 10. We
conclude, therefore, that the courts are required to
adapt themselves somewhat to the increased latitude
allowed to the commission, and that this adaptation
must at the same time, and as far as it can consistently
Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 AtI. 823 (1933).
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be done, avoid abandonment of cautions and safeguards which seem necessary, not only for constitutional due process of law, but also for the assurance
of reliability in the basis of adjudication. We conclude that the courts are not intended to withdraw
from litigants under the act all the precautions which
in the course of time have been worked
out as essen'
tials of orderly, certain justice. 62
The specific question involved in these cases was whether or not it was proper for the Court below to admit hearsay evidence. In two of the cases, 3 the hearsay evidence
was, in effect, corroborated by the testimony of eye witnesses. In one of the cases, 4 the testimony of eye witnesses
admitted an inference to the same effect as the hearsay
testimony.

In another case,6 5 the Court below admitted,

under objection, statements of a deceased workman, said
to have been made to his wife and to his physicians, as to
the occurrence of an accident as to which there was no direct evidence; the statements were reproduced by three
or four witnesses who heard them at first hand from the
workman and referred to a simple fact. In the most recent case, 6 the only evidence of the cause of the alleged
accident was the hearsay statements of the deceased to
his wife and physician, and the conclusion of the physician,
that the deceased had been overcome by poisonous gas
while working. In each of these five cases, the testimony
was held to have been properly admitted, although the
Court emphasized that how far the usual rules of evidence
are to be relaxed must be determined not by a general
rule, but by the facts of each case.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINDINGS

In no other phase of the subject has the liberal attitude
of the Court of Appeals been more marked than in the
much mooted matter of the scope of judicial review. The
Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 Atl. 850 (1925).

*' Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 Atl. 246 (1930) ; Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 AtI. 276 (1932).
c4 Horn

Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 8upra note 61.
e Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, supra note 62.
"Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 197 Atl. 302 (Md. 1938).
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position of the Court has been consistent; it will not substitute its own judgment on the facts for the finding of the
administrative agency.
Where the determination of the administrative tribunal
is essentially legislative in character or where it does not
directly affect vested rights of liberty or property, the
Court will not review the exercise of discretion, unless it
can clearly be shown that the power of the tribunal was
corruptly or fraudulently used. 7 The Court will intervene if there is no evidence to support the action of the
administrative agency,6 8 and will require the agency to exercise its discretion if action is required by statute. 69 But
the Court will not interfere with or control the method of
the exercise of discretion or the performance of any duty
requiring the exercise of judgment, nor will it correct
errors of discretion which have honestly been made in the
discharge of such duty within the limits of the prescribed
standard.70 In these decisions, the Court emphasizes the
peculiar fitness of administrative officials familiar with the
subject matter and informed by experience and training
to pass upon the questions of fact presented to them, and
recognizes that, in the absence of unusual circumstances,
not substitute their own judgments for
the Courts should
71
such findings.
Even in the rate making cases, where there are mixed
questions of law and of fact, the Court of Appeals has
consistently adhered to the rule that it will not disturb the
order of the commission, except upon clear and satisfac2 It will
tory evidence that it is unreasonable or unlawful.
7 Wiley v. School Commissioners, 51 Md. 401 (1879); Murphy v. State
Roads Commission, suprz note 56; State Funeral Directors Assn. v. State
Board of Undertakers, 150 Md. 294, 133 Ati. 62 (1926).
"Applestein v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra note 54.
Manger v. Board of Examiners, 90 Md. 659, 45 AtI. 891 (1900).
,8 Cases cited supra note 37.
Public Service Commn. v. United Railways Co., 155 Md. 572, 142 Atl.
870 (1928) reversed, 280 U. S. 234, 74 L. ed. 390, 50 S. Ct. 123 (1932);
Cahill v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 196 Atl. 305 (Md. 1938).
is Public Service Commn. v. Northern Railway Co., 122 Md. 355, 90 At.
105 (1914) ; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Public Service Comnn., 126 Md. 59,
94 Atl. 330 (1915) ; Havre de Grace Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commn.,
132 Md. 16, 103 Ati. 319 (1918) ; Public Service Commn. v. Byron, supra
note 55; Public Service Commn. v. United Railways Co., supra note 71.
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not substitute its independent examination of the facts
for that of the commission to which the carrying out of the
state policy has been delegated. The position of the Court
of Appeals on this matter has been substantially similar to
that of the minority of the Supreme Court in74 Crowell v.
BensoWt& and the St. Joseph Stock Yards case.
CONCLUSION

Court control is only one of the safeguards offered
by the American system of government for the proper development of the administrative process. The Court of
Appeals, in every phase of the subject, has evidenced its
conviction that the supremacy of the law does not demand
the substitution of the Court's judgment for that of the
administrators. On the contrary, subject to insistence
upon basic principles of fairness, the Court has allowed
to administrative agencies the freedom of function which
is vital to their successful operation. But judicial abstention does not of itself insure that success. Public insistence upon a trained and able personnel; intensive analytical study of the actual workings of the agencies by the bar,
the law schools and the press; legislative scrutiny of the
methods by which the various administrative bodies carry
out the policies entrusted to them, and of the results of
their activities in the subject matter of regulation-all are
necessary for efficient government under the principles of
our democracy.
S 285 U. S. 22, 65, 76 L. ed. 598, 621, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
"St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73, 80 L. ed.
1033, 1052, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936).

